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This paper analyses two decades of economic adjustment in Latin America and the Caribbean,
focusing on its impact on the agricultural (and in some cases, the rural) sector. A critical
evaluation of the dramatic structural changes that took place in the region is merited in the face
of the new international financial crisis that is affecting the continent, especially since the
agricultural sector has not been given sufficient significance in the reform process.
The context of such an analysis gradually changed during the 1990s. The Washington
Consensus, which was previously predominant among the international financial institutions
(IFIs), gave primary importance to the correction of relative prices; it has been complemented or
partly replaced by neo-institutional and even neo-structuralist ideas, in view of the continuing
existence of serious market failures and the negative effects of over-adjustment in relation to the
so-called “minimal state” (Killick, 1989, 1995; Streeten, 1993; ECLAC, 1996; Ramos, 1997).
This paper's analysis of the effects of adjustment on the agricultural sector contributes to a more
qualified view of the overall process of reforms in Latin America and the Caribbean not only by
investigating concretely the sectoral impact, but also by comparing original assumptions and
expectations with implemented reforms and outcomes.
The import substitution industrialization (ISI) model, which was implemented throughout
much of the region during the post-war period until the early 1980s, discriminated against
agriculture through exchange rate overvaluation, export taxes, protection of the industrial sector
and direct market interventions. In particular, the overvaluation of the exchange rates was related
to a spur in imports during the 1970s, while the interventionist price policies were blamed for
causing reduced growth and poor export performance (Krueger and others, 1991). The
agricultural sector did reasonably well in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, however, as
price discrimination was combined with a substantial package of support measures (e.g., public
investment, subsidized credit and agricultural services).
This paper demonstrates that the assumed bad performance of the sector during the 1980s
(the so-called lost decade) has to be qualified in view of the available macroeconomic and
sectoral data, in particular with regard to the first half of the 1980s. Substantial differences can
be observed between the performance of the macroeconomy and the behaviour of the Latin
American and Caribbean agricultural sector, both during and after this period, for the region as a
whole and among individual countries. Furthermore, the shift toward an export-led growth model
(Weeks, 1995; Bulmer-Thomas, 1996; Thorpe, 1997) did not overcome the so-called paradox of
agriculture, in which verbal recognition of the sector's importance in the economy was
6contradicted by low investment priorities and deficient (or even absent) sectoral policy (Weeks,
1995; Spoor, 1997; Reca and Echeverría, 1998).
The paper also seeks to contribute to an overall review of agricultural (and rural)
development policies in Latin America and the Caribbean. There is a tendency to focus on
economic dynamism in certain sectors, most often those linked to international capital and
transnational corporations (TNCs), while ignoring the marginalization of others, including the
most populous small farmer and peasant sectors. Although this issue falls outside the main scope
of the paper, the analysis points toward a new role for the State, one that does not return to the
interventionist agenda, but rather takes a more indirect, albeit activist, public role with regard to
this important sector (De Janvry and Sadoulet, 1993; Spoor, 1995, 1997).
To establish an empirical foundation for such an effort, data are presented and analysed
on the performance of the macroeconomy and the agricultural sector, supported by country-
based data for nine Latin American and Caribbean countries. These data not only indicate the
variation in growth performance among the economies (with substantial spread around the
mean), but also represent a very large share of the production and exports of the region’s
agricultural sector. The countries included in the sample are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mexico and Peru.1
The main propositions put forward in this paper are the following. First, the agricultural
sector in Latin America and the Caribbean was structurally underestimated in its importance,
before, during and after the economic adjustment reforms. This is particularly striking given that
the success of the export-led growth model is still largely based on agricultural exports. Second,
the debt crisis of the early 1980s generally hit agriculture later, and the performance of the
agricultural sector during the lost decade of the 1980s, while showing great diversity among (and
within) countries, was generally better than the region's macroeconomic crisis would suggest,
particularly in the first half of the decade. In fact, the main crops for both domestic and export
markets experienced a perhaps unexpected increase in land productivity, which was surprisingly
high if compared with that of the 1990s and not in line with the previously accepted idea of
agriculture as a stagnant sector. Its residual treatment within the predominantly macro-oriented
reforms make these observations even more relevant.
Third, with the exception of early reformers such as Chile, and partially also Bolivia,
Costa Rica and Mexico, the economic reforms in the agricultural sector were basically
implemented during the second half of the 1980s or even later. It is therefore difficult to identify
simple causal relations between reforms attributed to the 1980s and the overall recovery of the
1990s, as in a number of cases the contraction in agriculture (and the rapid recovery of
agricultural exports) preceded, coincided with or followed the implementation of sectoral and
macroeconomic reforms that were intended to eliminate the supposed bias against agriculture.
Fourth, the reforms also had a negative impact on sectoral performance as an outcome of
the elimination of subsidies, credit and technological support services. Wherever possible, these
effects have to be differentiated from the unfavourable development of international market
7prices for the traditional Latin American agro-exports in the 1980s, at least compared with the
late 1970s. The sectoral data suggest that at least in some instances, earlier public interventions
in market-led modernizations paid off (e.g., Chile and Costa Rica). In other cases, in which long-
term public support was followed by a process of market liberalization and deregulation,
recovery came only with the use of careful measures of "reregulation" during apparent
contractionary periods (e.g., Bolivia, Brazil and Colombia, but also Chile).
Fifth, the new development model for Latin America and the Caribbean, which was
introduced with the structural adjustment of the 1980s and early 1990s (Smith, et al., 1993;
Teitel, 1992; Bulmer-Thomas, 1996), is quite exclusionary (Kay, 1995; Reca and Echeverria,
1998). The dynamics of economic growth are largely to be found within the sectors of
commercial farmers who have been able to establish linkages with foreign, mostly transnational,
capital, thereby integrating themselves in domestic and international agribusiness complexes.
The early optimism about the options for small farmers and peasants to modernize through
contract farming for agribusiness has not been sufficiently justified in practice (ECLAC, 1995;
1998a). Furthermore, there are indications that the gap (in levels of technology, productivity and
income) between the commercial and entrepreneurial farmers and the "non-viable peasants"
(campesinos no-viables) has grown larger than ever (Kay, 1995; Bulmer-Thomas, 1996; Reca
and Echeverria, 1998). Economic policies directed toward modernizing the latter group are
largely absent, as are social policies to mitigate the human costs of economic adjustment in view
of continuing high levels of rural poverty (ECLAC/IICA, 1998).
The paper analyses these five propositions in the following three sections. The second
section investigates the main assumptions behind structural adjustment, in particular the vision of
a stagnating sector and the overall bias against agriculture, with an overview of the
macroeconomy and the place of the agricultural sector in the region's economies before the
reforms, during the crisis and in the post-crisis period. This picture turns out to be more mixed
and less straightforward than is generally assumed. The crisis hit the Latin American economies
at different moments, particularly in the agricultural sector. Comparing the selected countries
reveals three types of development in the 1980s: early crisis (1980-1985), late crisis (1985-1990)
and prolonged crisis (1980-1990). The first two types seem to coincide with observed patterns of
swift and slow recovery.2 This somewhat qualifies the overall picture of a lost decade, especially
when one takes into account that the first half of the 1980s saw a substantial increase in land
productivity, in contrast to the second half of the decade.
The third section reviews the main reforms of the stabilization and structural adjustment
programmes, distinguishing between macroeconomic and sectoral reforms. The analysis
concentrates on those reforms that deal with trade policy (apertura, or openness, and exchange
rate devaluation); with fiscal, credit and interest rate policies; and finally with the reduced public
role in support services (e.g., credit provision, education, extension and research). Instead of
following a standard periodization of  pre-reform (before 1980), crisis (early 1980s), reform
(1980s) and post-reform recovery (1990s), the paper reveals a diversity in the sequencing and
implementation of the reforms, as well as substantial differences in macroeconomic and sectoral
performance per country.
8The fourth section summarizes the analysis of the reforms, their sectoral impact and the
discrepancy between original assumptions on performance, implementation and sequencing of
reforms and outcomes, as presented in the second and third sections. Concluding remarks refer to
the originally formulated propositions, in view of the data that were presented and analysed in
the paper. The importance of putting agricultural policy on the agenda, with a renewed public
role in agricultural (and rural) development in Latin America and the Caribbean is emphasized,
as part and parcel of a second generation of reforms in several of the economies in the region.
9II.  ANTI-AGRICULTURE BIAS AND GROWTH PERFORMANCE
Structural adjustment was primarily geared to restructure the economies of Latin America and
the Caribbean in order to be able to confront external shocks, repay foreign debt and regain
sustained growth rates. With the emerging crisis of the early 1980s, in particular 1982-1983, the
macroeconomy had to be stabilized. This was mainly attempted through fiscal and credit policy
adjustments, while exchange rate alignment was used to improve export incentives. The latter
was expected to have an important impact on the agricultural sector, which until then had been
confronted with price disincentives caused by controls, taxation and consumer subsidies.
It is fairly easy to find evidence of relative domestic price discrimination against
tradables, in most cases with a severely overvalued exchange rate and export taxes (Krueger and
others, 1991). It is more difficult, however, to argue that there was an overall resource transfer
out of the agricultural sector, especially when one considers credit subsidies, which are
transferred through default in times of inflation, and flexible policies on bad debts, public
investment programmes and subsidized support services. While presenting the case of a bias
against agriculture in Brazilian domestic price policy, Brandao and Carvalho (1991, pp. 77-78)
therefore note that under ISI, transfers were positive if credit is included in the calculations.3
Buainain and de Castro Resende (1995) further conclude that Brazil’s complex of interventionist
policies, including a minimum price programme (MPP), actually sustained high growth rates in
the agricultural sector until the introduction of adjustment in 1987.4
1.  From sustained growth to crisis in the lost decade
What, then, was the actual performance of agriculture in the 1970s and 1980s? While Latin
America's GDP grew at high and sustained average rates of 5.9% in 1970-1975 and 5.5% in
1975-1980, the agricultural sector did reasonably well with GDP growth rates of 3.4% and 3.6%
respectively. Table 1 shows that in the early 1980s the debt crisis and a general depression in the
world economy hit the national economies of the region very hard, causing a severe drop in
average GDP growth to only 0.3% in 1980-1985. The agricultural sector, while acting as a buffer
for the domestic economy, had its growth rate diminished to 2.7%; this is consistent with the
increased share of agriculture in total GDP. When some agricultural prices were still controlled,
real growth is sometimes overestimated or a smaller increase is calculated than the total GDP
deflator would indicate. However, the product data in table 1 seem reasonably consistent with
growth rates of volume output.
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Table 1




Indicator 1970-1975 1975-1980 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995
Total GDP 5.9 5.5 0.3 1.6 3.3
Agricultural GDP 3.4 3.6 2.7 1.3 3.1
Agricultural/total GDPa .. 8.4 9.4 9.3 9.3
Agricultural Product
Total value 2.5 3.5 2.9 1.7 2.7
   Crops .. 2.9 3.1 2.3 1.6
   Animal Products .. 4.2 2.8 2.2 2.7
   Cereals .. 3.0 3.8 1.0 1.1
   Oil Products .. 8.6 4.6 4.9 3.3
   Roots and Tubers .. -0.8 -0.2 0.9 -0.3
   Vegetables .. 3.8 2.7 3.2 1.9
   Fruits .. 3.3 2.8 3.1 2.9
Source: ECLAC/IICA, Panorama de la agricultura de América Latina y el Caribe en las últimas
décadas, Santiago, 1998, FAOSTAT, 1998.
a End of period.
Gradually declining population growth rates caused the sectoral per capita GDP growth
rate to improve toward the end of the 1970s, while in the early 1980s it was far from stagnant.
Because the share of agricultural GDP was only around 8-9% of total GDP, the influence of this
buffer was relatively limited. However, the rural population of Latin America and the Caribbean
was still nearly 43% in the first half of the 1970s and around 35% a decade later, which indicates
the importance of the sector in terms of income and employment (ECLAC/IICA, 1998).
Individual countries were much more differentiated than the aggregate data of table 1 would
suggest. Figure 1 depicts the growth rates of total GDP and agricultural GDP for the project
countries (except Jamaica). The countries are classified according to their patterns of crisis and
recovery: early, late or prolonged crisis during the 1980s, followed (though not always directly)
by adjustment with swift or slow recovery. Chile, Colombia, Bolivia and Costa Rica experienced
an early crisis with a swift recovery that was already evident in the 1985-1990 period. Brazil and
Mexico show a pattern of decline that culminated in a late crisis with slow recovery. In the case
of Brazil, the GDP growth rate had already dropped to 0.9% in the first half of the 1980s, but this
was moderated by a surprisingly good performance in agriculture with a 3.8% annual sectoral
GDP growth. Finally, for various reasons (such as political turmoil), Argentina and Peru
underwent a prolonged crisis in the 1980s.
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Figure 1
GROWTH OF GDP AND AGRICULTURAL GDP, 1970-1995: EARLY, LATE OR PROLONGED CRISIS
WITH SWIFT OR SLOW RECOVERY





























































The argument that the region's agricultural sector reveals a different growth pattern than
do the national economies as a whole is strengthened by data on the yields of the main crops,
both for the domestic market and for export. Table 2 shows the growth rates of land productivity
for coffee, cotton, fruit, maize, potatoes, rice, soybean, sugarcane and wheat, between 1970 and
1995. The yearly increases in yields, averaged for all crops, were substantially better in 1980-
1985 (with 3.5%) than in 1975-1980 (1.2%) and 1970-1975 (2.1%). The rise in land productivity
dropped substantially between 1985 and 1990, while during the first half of the 1990s, yield
increases were restored, albeit at a lower level than the first half of the lost decade.5 Individual
crops varied considerably from the average, most notably coffee, fruit, maize and soybean.
While using annual averages for five-year periods, in most cases the spread is very high.
Also, labour productivity increased at a higher rate than in other sectors in the 1970s (2.2%
versus 1.8% in 1973-1980) and 1980s (1.9% versus –1.1% in 1980-1990) (ECLAC, 1996, pp.
91-92).6 Both observations somewhat contradict the idea that the bias against agriculture had led
to stagnation in the 1980s and that adjustment, which came mostly in the late 1980s or early
1990s, would particularly benefit the sector.
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Table 2
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROWTH RATE OF YIELDS
OF MAJOR CROPS, 1970-1995
(Annual percentages)
Growth rate
Crop 1970-1975 1975-1980 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995
Coffee 7.3 -0.9 6.4 -0.1 -0.9
Cotton 2.0 1.1 5.0 4.6 3.7
Fruit -0.8 0.3 -0.6 0.6 1.4
Maize 1.0 3.5 2.7 -0.5 5.5
Potato 1.5 1.5 4.1 1.1 2.2
Rice 1.3 1.1 4.2 0.8 4.2
Soybean 6.4 1.4 1.7 0.7 3.2
Sugarcane -0.3 1.1 1.4 0.4 0.1
Wheat 0.2 2.0 6.2 0.2 2.4
Average 2.1 1.2 3.5 0.9 2.4
Source: Author's calculations, on the basis of FAOSTAT (1998).
2.  The export-led growth model and agricultural exports
The production of tradables is the agricultural subsector that is most strongly linked to the
macroeconomy and external markets. This area displays some interesting phenomena.
Agricultural exports grew impressively in the 1970s (benefiting from substantial international
price increases for traditional agricultural exports). This contradicts at least part of the argument
that the ISI model caused domestic price discrimination against tradables, and it is coherent with
a rather stable insertion of agricultural exports into world markets.7
Table 3
TOTAL AND AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS (1970-97)
(Average annual percentages)
Growth rate
Country and type of export 1970-1975 1975-1980 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-1997
Total Latin America and the Caribbean
    Total Exports 22.4 26.1 0.0 6.4 12.3a
   Agricultural Exportsb 18.8 13.2 -0.4 2.8   6.4a   9.6
Nine Selected Countriesc
    Average Total Exports 17.8 21.9 -1.4 10.0 13.1 6.9
    Agricultural  Exports b 23.0 12.9 -1.3 12.9 13.1 11.2
Agricultural /total exportsd 59.3 52.9 33.8 36.3 27.5 24.4
Sources: FAOSTAT (1998); ECLAC/IICA, Panorama de la agricultura de América Latina y el Caribe en las últimas
décadas, Santiago, 1998; IMF Trade Statistics Yearbooks.
a Fell in 1991-1993.
b Not including forestry and fishery exports.
c Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mexico and Peru.
d Including forestry and fishery exports.
Average growth of total exports came to a halt in the period 1980-1985, as an outcome of
the general crisis, and agricultural exports (in value) dropped to similar near-zero levels. This
decrease is partly explained by a severe external shock, in particular during 1982-1983, when
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agricultural export prices dropped dramatically. Although wild fluctuations occurred in
agricultural export values and volumes (measured per product), a careful evaluation of the latter
indicator, using FAOSTAT data for major commodities such as coffee, cotton, maize, meat, rice,
soybean and wheat, shows an average growth rate of 12.2% per year in 1980-1985 and only
1.7% per year in 1985-1990, when some prices recovered.
The share of agriculture in the region’s total exports, particularly when forestry and
fishery products are included, gradually decreased during the two decades under analysis, but it
still remained fairly high (see table 3). For some countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia
and Costa Rica, the share was substantially higher than the average. For example, in Argentina
the share diminished from 71.4% in 1975-1980 to 54.4% in 1990-1995, and in Brazil it fell from
58.3% to 32.7%. In Chile, with rapidly growing fruit, fishery and forestry exports, it increased
from 17.1% to 25.9% (FAOSTAT, 1998).
Figure 2






















Figure 2 shows that behind the averages of table 3, there is a rather consistent pattern of
fluctuations, with somewhat more extreme outliers for total exports and several dips
concentrated in very short periods, such as 1981-1983, 1985-1987, 1989 and 1991-1993 (the
latter for agricultural exports only). The export fluctuations themselves were influenced by the
volatility in international prices. A sample of important export crops for Latin America and the
Caribbean, including coffee, cotton, maize, rice, soybean, sugar and wheat, demonstrates violent
fluctuations in export prices with major falls in the 1980s (see figure 3). Furthermore, the
correlation between the growth rate and the fluctuations in the weighted export unit value index
is rather high (R2=0,64) (FAOSTAT, 1998). This is consistent with an observation made in an
important evaluative study of adjustment:
The relatively constant rate of increase in productivity suggests that the drop in
agricultural growth in the 1980s was due more to problems of demand than supply. Since
exports grew faster than agricultural output, the loss of momentum may have been due in
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part to a decline in domestic demand and in part to changes in profitability connected
with the fall in international prices (ECLAC,1996, pp. 91-92).
In particular, the drop in prices for cotton, maize, rice and wheat in the 1980s
corresponded with the drop in export values, during a period in which production and export
volumes on average were still growing substantially.8
The influence of world market prices on the region’s main agricultural products (with
violent fluctuations that continued into the late 1980s and 1990s) strengthens the view that the
agricultural sector was not stagnant in the early 1980s and that the sectoral crisis generally
occurred later, in some cases as a consequence of the adjustment that was undertaken to respond
to a macroeconomic (i.e., debt and fiscal) crisis.
Figure 3
























































































































































III.  STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
In the aftermath of the second oil crisis of the late 1970s, the Latin American debt crisis erupted
when interest rates rose sharply following a decade of vast borrowing of cheap capital (ECLAC,
1995, p. 23). The crisis announced the demise of the ISI model. As shown above, the agricultural
sector sustained its growth rates until the mid-1980s. Latin American exports were very
dependent on the agricultural sector, but overvaluation of domestic currencies did not favour the
production of tradables. Nevertheless, the growth of agricultural exports during the peak of the
ISI era was quite impressive (see table 3). When they did contract in the early 1980s, the drop in
international prices was largely to blame.
Apart from stabilization programmes, the early adjustment measures were directed
primarily toward opening the national economies to foreign markets (Smith et al., 1993; Ramos,
1997). Some countries such as Mexico had already lowered their high import tariffs in the early
1980s. Chile did so as early as 1974, when the new military regime followed a strict neo-liberal
approach in economic policies (Weeks, 1995; Krueger and others, 1991).
The need to restructure the Latin American and Caribbean economies in order to resume
sustained growth rates was related to their decreased ability to repay their foreign debts. This
became an even higher priority when countries like Bolivia and Mexico declared a debt
moratorium in the early 1980s, which sent a shock wave through the international financial
system. At the macroeconomic level, structural adjustment essentially meant the following
economic transformations. First, trade policy was adjusted to lower import tariffs, eliminate
quota systems and align the overvalued exchange rates through real depreciation. The latter
meant eliminating administrative controls and, in some cases, multiple exchange regimes.
Second, fiscal balance was restored and credit volumes, which had been largely subsidized, were
squeezed. Third, the size of the State was reduced, because it was perceived as the main cause of
market distortions and the source of bureaucratic failures. Finally, domestic markets were
liberalized to provoke a price-led supply response.
At the level of the agricultural sector, adjustment focused mostly on liberalizing domestic
market prices, eliminating sectoral institutions and squeezing credit volumes. At the same time,
the previously important agenda of land redistribution through administrative reforms was
replaced by allocation through land markets (Gomez Oliver, 1994; Weeks, 1995; Spoor, 1997;
Thorpe, 1997). The near absence of specific agricultural adjustment policies introduced another
bias that reinforced the paradox, in which the agricultural sector became residual in policy
making in the 1980s and early 1990s despite its economic importance. In response to the
negative impact of this residual treatment of the sector, however, some Latin American and
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Caribbean governments reintroduced sectoral policies (i.e., second generation reforms), such as
occurred in Brazil and Colombia in the early 1990s, to improve performance after an initial post-
reform crisis.
1.  The macroeconomic reforms
The trade regime was fundamental in the structural adjustment programmes of the Latin
American and Caribbean countries. Indicators of the degree of openness of the region’s
economies show an impressive change overall pointing to increased integration into a
dynamically developing world market.9
The ECLAC Agricultural Unit recently compared three subperiods, 1984-1987, 1988-
1990 and 1991-1993. These subperiods encompass the decade in which most changes in trade
policy took place, except for Mexico and Chile, which implemented changes earlier
(ECLAC/IICA, 1998). Figure 4 presents a sample of these changes using the average import
tariffs on food, which are indicative of the trend toward external market liberalization. The tariff
barriers that were crucial to the ISI model had indeed been dramatically lowered by the mid-
1990s, although it should be noted that the main reforms in this field were implemented in the
late 1980s and deepened in the early 1990s, which is much later than originally thought.
Figure 4
TARIFFS FOR FOOD IMPORTS











Source: ECLAC/IICA, Panorama de la agricultura de América Latina y el Caribe en
las últimas décadas, Santiago, 1998.
Weeks (1995, pp. 70-73) characterizes the change in trade regimes for 17 Latin American
countries for the mid- and late 1980s, differentiating between economies that are highly
liberalized, moderately liberalized or not liberalized. The study includes all of the countries
discussed in this paper except Jamaica, which makes it possible to use this differentiation and
expand it into the 1990s (see table 4, and compare with figure 4). All Latin American and
Caribbean economies have reformed their trade regimes to some degree, such that the non-
liberalized category no longer applies. While in the late 1980s three economies could still be
considered non-reformers (measured by the degree of liberalization), by the mid-1990s
Argentina and Peru demonstrated a high degree of liberalization and Brazil was moderately
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liberalized. Only Mexico, dropped to a lower category, largely as a result of its incorporation into
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA): depending on whether liberalization is
measured for internal or external markets, Mexico might now be considered moderately
liberalized, whereas initially, as an early reformer, it was classified as highly liberalized.
Table 4




Mid-to late 1980s Mid-to late 1990s
High Bolivia, Chile, Mexico Argentina, Bolivia, Chile,
Peru
Moderate Colombia, Costa Rica Brazil, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Mexico
None Argentina, Brazil, Peru --
Source: Adapted from Weeks, J. (Ed.), Structural Adjustment and the Agricultural Sector in Latin
America and the Caribbean, London, MacMillan, 1995.
Another important aspect of the changing trade regime involved exchange rate policies.
Actually, both the first stabilization programmes and the structural adjustment policies focused
on depreciation of the real exchange rates of Latin American currencies. This was seen as
another fundamental policy reform not only for stabilization, but also the elimination of the
existing price bias against agricultural exports, which resulted from the overvaluation of
domestic currencies.
Table 5
REAL EXCHANGE RATE MOVEMENTS
IN SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIES
Country 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995
High liberalized in late 1980s
Bolivia - - + + + +
Chile - - + + + -
Mexico - + + - - +
Moderately liberalized in late 1980s
Colombia - - + + - -
Costa Rica + - + - + -
Not liberalized in late 1980s
Argentina + + + - - -
Brazil + + + - + -
Peru - - + - - -
Note: +: depreciation of the real exchange rate; -: appreciation of the real exchange rate. Base year
(point of reference) = 1990.
Source: Author’s calculations, on the basis of ECLAC/IICA, Panorama de la Agricultura de
América Latina y el Caribe en las últimas décadas, Santiago, 1998; and IDB, Economic and Social
Progress in Latin America, 1992 Report, Washington, Inter-American Development Bank, 1992.
Tables 4 and 5 show that the degree of liberalization of the selected economies does not
always correspond with the expected development of the exchange rate. For example, Colombia
still had very high tariffs at the end of the 1980s, but it managed to have real depreciation of its
currency during that period. The same is true of Brazil. Chile and Bolivia, however, seem to fit
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into the scheme that was expected to appear during adjustment: high protection and an
appreciated exchange rate led to crisis, which stimulated high liberalization and real
depreciation, which, in turn, led to recovery. Other countries, such as Peru and Argentina, show
appreciated real exchange rates in combination with strong or moderate reforms in trade regimes;
this is partly explained by the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) that (re)penetrated the
region in the 1990s. Although opinions differ on the influence of apertura and the real exchange
rate on the agricultural sector (Weeks, 1995; Hopkins, 1995), in some countries these
developments did not provide sufficient improvement for agricultural commodities to penetrate
export markets. However, the reforms in the trade regime deepened in the 1990s toward a wider
liberalization of regional markets and the consolidation of regional free trade associations such
as NAFTA, in which Mexico is a member; the Southern Common Market, which incorporates
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, with Bolivia and Chile as associate members; and
various pacts among Andean countries.
Finally, apart from the trade and exchange rate regimes, fiscal policy was the other
fundamental target of structural adjustment, focusing on a rapid stabilization of the economies
after periods of sometimes galloping inflation. Orthodox and heterodox anti-inflationary
programmes were designed to re-establish the major balances in the economies using
combinations of fiscal and monetary policy. These included the Austral Plan (1985) and the
Convertibility Plan (1991) in Argentina, the mega-stabilization programme in Bolivia (1985), the
series of stabilization programmes embodied in the Cruzado, Bresser, Summer, Coller and
Cardozo plans in Brazil (1986-1994) and stabilization efforts in Mexico (1987-1988, and again
in response to the crisis of 1994) (Bruno and others, 1992; Killick, 1995; Dijkstra, 1997).
As we have seen, only in some cases, such as Chile and Mexico, was the trade regime
radically changed jointly with the fiscal reforms. Others, such as Argentina and Brazil, continued
assessing high tariffs in the midst of stabilization plans; Argentina also imposed substantial
export taxes until the early 1990s (Maletta, 1995, p.132). Countries thus display large
differentiation in their reforms, which is an important point for understanding the impact of
adjustment on the agricultural sector.
2.  Sectoral Reforms in Agriculture
In a context of dynamically changing international markets, it is difficult to clearly separate the
effects of macroeconomic reforms (e.g., trade regime, exchange rates and fiscal reforms) from
those that are more particularly focused on the agricultural sector (Gomez Oliver, 1994).
Nevertheless, some crucial changes warrant a critical analysis, such as the liberalization of
domestic prices, the reforms in rural finance and credit, the gradual reform or elimination of
parastatal marketing and service institutions and the changing access to land through market-led
distribution.
Throughout most of the 1980s, price policies in many Latin American and Caribbean
economies, including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and to a lesser degree Mexico, retained
aspects of the previously dominant package, with minimum price programmes, “buyer of last
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resort” policies, consumer subsidies and even large-scale procurement programmes. Radical
reforms were only implemented in the 1990s. In Brazil, for example, the combination of various
supportive policies for agriculture (e.g., minimum prices, subsidized credit and state
procurement) remained in force until 1987, when the first reform programmes were implemented
(Buainain and de Castro Rezende, 1995); in Colombia, such practices continued through the
early 1990s. In Chile, Comercializadora de Trigo S.A. (COTRISA) continues to purchase grain
even now.
In other cases, such as Mexico, restrictive fiscal policy focused particularly on squeezing
the large volume of agricultural subsidies, which unfortunately also affected the previously high
level of public investment. According to Gomez Oliver (1995, p. 27), public investment rapidly
decreased from 12% of budgetary expenditure in 1980 to less than 6% in 1989. The level of
agricultural subsidies in Mexico, in particular through credit, was very high until the early 1980s,
but it fell dramatically during the decade, from 22% of agricultural GDP to less than a quarter of
that level (Gomez Oliver, 1995).
Credit policy was reformed mainly for fiscal reasons. Most governments had used rural
credit as a distributive instrument rather than for financial intermediation, although the banking
system suffered enormous losses. Furthermore, during the 1980s the predominant ideas about
credit moved away from using subsidized credit to promote technological innovation, and using
development banks to reach peasant farmers, towards an emphasis on positive real interest rates,
viable rural financial institutions and market-led access to credit. This led to a concentration of
access to formal credit, which mainly favoured commercial producers and excluded many
peasant farmers (Thorpe, 1997, pp.21-22). The total volume of credit also dropped enormously,
while real interest rates surged to high levels. According to Buainain and de Castro Rezende
(1995, p.159), in Brazil rural credit loans contracted from a level of around US$ 25 billion in
1980 to around US$ 6 million in 1990; the major drop took place after the introduction of a
policy of squeezing credit in 1987, which caused the real interest rate to rise from –33.3% in
1986 to 7.0% in 1987! In Mexico, real interest rates remained negative until 1988, but credit
volume decreased by 40% at constant prices; after 1988, credit volume rose, with positive real
interest rates (Salcedo Baca 1998, pp. 26-27). In Nicaragua, which has not been incorporated into
the database used for much of this analysis, the Opposition National Union (UNO) government
that rose to power in 1990 heavily cut the formal credit of the National Development Bank
(BANADES), largely for fiscal reasons. In a matter of two years, the number of peasant families
that received credit dropped from 97,217 to only 34,682, excluding most small producers (Spoor,
1995, p. 206).
Some alternative forms of rural finance (re)appeared in the 1980s and early 1990s,
partially bridging the gap created by reducing credit volumes. These included the traditional
money lenders, savings and credit schemes operated by non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
(focused on micro finance) and finance related to contract farming for domestic and international
agribusiness. Nevertheless, the fundamental change in rural financial markets, with the squeezing
of formal credit, negatively influenced agricultural production, in particular affecting those small
producers who had benefited from previously generous credit policies. Such policies provided a
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form of income support during the non-harvest season, as well as access to scarce working
capital which otherwise would only be available at very high interest rates. In the post-reform
rural financial markets, most small producers have limited access to credit. The liberalization of
the region’s financial markets generated high real interest rates that are largely prohibitive for
peasant producers.
Mosley et al. (1991) note that structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) implemented
institutional changes very gradually, in particular with regard to instruments of market
intervention. This was due to the political interests behind the existing parastatal structures and
the employment effects of deregulation and privatization. Whether this gradual change was
positive for agriculture needs to be examined. Parastatal marketing organizations, sometimes in
combination with development banks, were very strongly present in Latin America and the
Caribbean, as part of the strongly interventionist, inward-looking model of ISI. Huge companies
such as the National Basic Commodity Corporation (CONASUPO) in Mexico, ENABAS in
Nicaragua, the Agricultural Marketing Institute (IDEMA) in Colombia and the National Postal
Service (CAN) in Brazil were active in the foodstuffs sector, while other state agencies marketed
important agricultural exports (e.g., coffee, cotton, meat and sugar) and inputs such as fertilizers
and pesticides. These institutions operated as near monopolies for many years and most were not
eliminated until the early and mid-1990s. In some cases, such as Mexico, they were replaced by
others (see Salcedo Baca, 1998).
Adjustment tended toward “state minimalism” (Streeten, 1993), which affected public
support systems such as extension, education and research. In part this was an outcome of the
restrictive budgetary policies, but it also represented a clear shift in thinking about the provision
of public goods, introducing market-led principles of cost recovery for services and private
investments in these areas. Although the critique on the previous bureaucratic system was largely
justified, in particular for failing to reach the peasant farmer, the issue of differential access has
been underestimated, to say the least, throughout the process of privatization and deregulation.
The market-led distribution of support services for the agricultural sector tends to exclude
marginal peasant farmers (campesinos no-viables), while giving larger commercial farmers
sufficient access.
With the elimination of most of the direct marketing intervention instruments,
intervention in agricultural markets was minimal by the late 1980s and early 1990s. In some
cases, price controls were replaced by the more indirect price bands (e.g., Brazil, Chile,
Colombia and El Salvador), which focused on dampening the effects of extreme world market
price fluctuations on the domestic market, through the use of variable import tariffs (both
negative and positive). Other countries retained the minimum price policies, but state agencies
lost their capacity to buy market surpluses, such that the minimum prices had only a token
significance.
Finally, the liberalization of input and output markets, deregulation and openness toward
external markets was accompanied by a transition from traditional redistributive land reform
policy, to the establishment of land markets, which let the market decide the issue of access to
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land. In some countries, such as Chile, access to water was also turned over to the market. This
transition has brought about processes of decollectivization, as occurred in Honduras, Nicaragua
and Peru, and the privatization of communal lands, such as the ejidos in Mexico.10
The deregulation of land markets and the issuing of private property titles were expected
to provide long-term security for investments and to make land suitable as collateral for credit.
Like other markets, however, land markets were often “missing”, and the highly skewed
distribution of assets and power in Latin American agriculture severely limited access for small
producers through the market, following the withdrawal of state regulation. Interestingly enough,
this field display strong differences in reform performance: a reformist country such as Bolivia,
for example, has not followed this line with respect to land (Morales, 1991).
More recently, Latin American and Caribbean countries have opened their doors for
foreign ownership of land. In some countries, such as Argentina and Chile, this has led to large
purchases by transnational companies not only of productive land, as in the forestry sector, but
also of non-productive parks and nature areas, as a sort of long-term investment. Property
legislation, both domestic and in relation to FDI, fundamentally changed over the past two
decades. In that sense, an analysis of the agricultural sector should not focus solely on narrowly
defined markets, prices and institutions, but rather should include the dramatically changed rules
of the game, which for some countries has caused a major loss of national control over resources,
through the transnationalization of the privatization process that was initiated with structural
adjustment.
All these fundamental changes in product and factor markets in Latin America and the
Caribbean have influenced not only economic growth, but also income and asset distribution in
rural areas. Although this fundamental issue should be addressed in a separate paper, it should be
present within any analysis of structural adjustment in the agricultural (and rural) sector. In the
1970s, rural poverty and indigence (i.e., extreme poverty levels) decreased from 62% and 34%,
respectively, in 1970, to 54% and 28% in 1980. By 1990 both indicators had risen again to 56%
and 33%, and they stagnated in the first half of the 1990s at 55% and 33% (ECLAC/IICA, 1998).
Preliminary data for 1996 suggest an improvement, but the severe crisis that hit the region in the
second half of 1998 will most probably negatively affect these indicators.
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IV.  CONCLUDING REMARKS: DYNAMISM AND MARGINALIZATION
An analysis of the impact of structural adjustment on agriculture might focus exclusively on the
aggregate economic indicators of the macroeconomy and the agricultural sector, following a
standard periodization (i.e., pre-reform, crisis, reform and post-reform recovery), using aggregate
data and emphasising the recovery after the lost decade of the 1980s (for a critique see Spoor,
1997). This paper, in contrast, uses a more unconventional approach to demonstrate that the
indicators for the agricultural sector, in particular country and product data, present a rather
mixed picture.
This mixed picture can be summarized in the following manner. First, moving beyond the
general focus on macroeconomic indicators an analysis of product-based and aggregate sectoral
data indicates that the lost decade argument should be qualified, at least for agriculture. Also, the
price bias against agriculture (caused by exchange rate overvaluation and domestic price
policies) may not have been so predominant as generally assumed in view of wide-scale
compensatory measures such as subsidies, trade protection and credit, as was shown for Brazil
and Mexico and even for early reformers such as Bolivia and Chile.
Although the debt crisis hit most Latin American and Caribbean countries hard during the
first half of the 1980s, a number of countries show an early crisis (with swift recovery), some a
late crisis (with slow recovery) and others a prolonged crisis. The position of agriculture in a
region that is normally seen as urbanized is somewhat peculiar. Both before and after reform,
agricultural exports (including forestry and fishery products) formed an important share in total
exports of the region. In spite of the bias against agriculture mentioned above, agricultural
exports grew at very high percentages in the 1970s, benefiting from high world market prices. In
the early 1980s, they suffered under the substantial drop in international prices: while physical
export volumes continued to grow, the growth of agricultural export values stagnated. The
agricultural sector continued to grow in terms of output and its share in GDP during the first half
of the 1980s, under the influence of substantial factor productivity increases (i.e., land and
labour). Agriculture, which is still crucial for a large section of the population, seems to have
functioned as a buffer in the macroeconomic crisis, challenging the idea of a stagnating sector in
the 1980s. During the 1970s (under ISI), the sector had actually developed rapidly in spite of
price discrimination. These observations might provide some clues to answer the question of
why adjustment had a quite differentiated sectoral impact.
Second, most of the macroeconomic stabilization reforms and some of the structural
adjustment reforms were introduced in the early 1980s, during or in response to the debt crisis. In
the agricultural sector, however, economic and in particular institutional adjustment largely took
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place in the late 1980s and early 1990s, with some notable exceptions such as Bolivia and Chile.
Although this has to be investigated on a case-by-case basis, reforms oriented toward the
agricultural sector were sometimes implemented in response to stagnation, but in other cases
they coincided with or even contributed to stagnation, such as in Brazil in the late 1980s and
Colombia in the early 1990s. Some of these more complex effects of adjustment have been
analysed above by looking at the impact of trade and exchange regimes, fiscal and credit policy
reforms and the liberalization and deregulation of product and factor markets. It was also noted
that they sometimes preceded the reforms (e.g., Brazil, Chile and Mexico), while in other cases
were implemented as part and parcel of second generation reforms (such as in Brazil and
Mexico, and more recently in Argentina). In particular, they partly fill the institutional gap
caused by the promotion of a minimal state during the first phase of structural adjustment. Some
new initiatives that focus on the agricultural sector, the participation of small farmers and
technological innovation include the Rural Assistance Programme (PROCAMPO) in Mexico; the
Colombian Fund for Scientific Research and Special Projects (COLCIENCIAS) and the Rural
Capitalization Incentive (ICR) in Colombia; and various programmes related to the Popular
Participation Act and the process of decentralization in Bolivia.
Third, this analysis of the impact of structural adjustment on the agricultural sector does
not support the mainstream idea of crisis-reform-recovery-growth. The 1990s (until the crisis at
the end of the decade) indeed represented recovery in terms of productivity, output growth and
exports, but with significant differences among countries and with severe fluctuations.
Furthermore, in comparison with the 1970s, the recovery of these indicators is not very
impressive. Indeed, the impact of adjustment was more complex than its designers originally
expected. Incentives provided through market liberalization, exchange rate alignment (with its
contradictory movements) increased openness and deregulation improved the position of those in
the market who produced tradables, provided that they were not resource poor, which would
limit any price-led supply response. For the latter category of mostly peasant farmers, adjustment
policies had negative effects through the elimination of subsidized credit and institutions that
were involved in agricultural support services. Improved export prices, decreased taxation and
other adjustment-related incentives for producers did not always compensate for the effects of
state withdrawal. In an economic analysis of Bolivia, Morales (1991, p.66), noted that “public
resources for agriculture have been very limited in Bolivia,” and that “macroeconomic stability
and more appropriate relative prices are not sufficient to bring about large-scale agricultural
production and productivity growth. Adjustment programmes, such as the NEP [New Economic
Policy, MS], need the complement of government support, in particular in the form of more
effective governmental investments in agriculture.”
The most dynamic response to adjustment came from medium-sized and large
commercial producers, who linked domestic capital with that of mostly transnational
agribusiness, and from entrepreneurial small farmers, who were mostly involved in fruits and
vegetables. The major growth sectors in Latin American and Caribbean agriculture are meat, oil
products, vegetables and fruit (Dirven, 1997; ECLAC/IICA, 1998, p. 21). The first two
categories represent strong economics of scale in production; the latter two (and also flowers)
represent mostly dynamic small and medium-sized producers who gradually entered into
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contract farming schemes with agro-industrial production and processing chains (ECLAC, 1995;
1998a). Countries such as Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico saw an enormous expansion of the
horticultural sector, and other non-traditional agricultural exports as well, with Brazil and Chile
showing strong growth in fruits; Argentina, Bolivia and Colombia boosted their oil-producing
crops (ECLAC, pp. 21-27). Particularly in the 1990s, substantial growth occurred in both non-
traditional agricultural exports for niche markets and the new traditional exports for bulk markets
(e.g., soybean, wood pulp, plywood, etc.).
The large inflow of FDI in the agribusiness sector revolutionized technology, not so
much in the production sector, where the gap in factor productivity grew evenly with the
developed world (ECLAC/IICA, 1998), but in processing and marketing, particularly of the food
system. A rapid transnationalization process emerged, with conglomerates of TNCs dominating
food markets. This transformation was aided by the processes of privatization of the financial,
communications and energy sectors, which previously were monopolized by the state, and of
parastatal marketing companies. These processes, which took place largely during the early to
mid-1990s, contributed to the concentration of market power that is currently visible in Latin
American and Caribbean economies.
Returning to the set of propositions presented at the outset of this paper, agriculture in
Latin America and the Caribbean received less discrimination under ISI than was originally
perceived, and it also performed better in the 1980s, particularly in the first half, than the lost
decade concept would suggest. It was treated as the stepchild of the economy in the reforms
(Spoor, 1997), mostly receiving residual treatment and even contradictory signals (in terms of
institutional gaps relating to agricultural services, the absence of rural finance, low levels of
public rural investment and sometimes appreciating real exchange rates).
Market deregulation and the privatization of marketing and services parastatals that took
place in most countries in the region during the late 1980s and early 1990s were expected to
produce efficient private market structures. This was a much more complicated process than
originally envisaged. Only in the early 1990s did a broader recognition of the existence of
“missing markets” penetrate development debates (De Janvry and Sadoulet, 1993). Furthermore,
the policy toward a minimal state severely undermined governments’ capacity to develop and
implement specific sectoral policies, which were very necessary for the agricultural sector in an
era of fundamental changes in markets, institutions and relative prices. This was not only caused
by the physical downsizing of the state, but also by the dominant “pro-market”, “anti-state”
political tendencies. An example in this respect can be found in the post-1990 adjustment process
in Nicaragua (Spoor, 1994; 1995; De Groot and Spoor, 1994).11
In reviewing two decades of adjustment, however, it should also be stressed that this
context has changed somewhat. A wave of second generation reforms has placed renewed
emphasis on building new central, regional, local, public and private institutions and the
formulation and implementation of agricultural and rural development policies.12 The need for
reintroducing an important public role in agricultural and rural development is indeed more
widely recognized as a means of improving and strengthening the existing dynamism that certain
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entrepreneurial subsectors clearly show (in particular versus export markets, but also in terms of
expanding domestic food markets, as in Brazil). It is also crucial for coherently tackling the
largely underestimated problems of marginality and poverty experienced by large numbers of
landless and land-poor peasant farmers in Latin America and the Caribbean. New attempts to
integrate them in, rather than exclude them from, processes of improved technology, credit
markets and local and regional markets should therefore be combined with an emphasis on badly
needed safety networks, social security and poverty alleviation programmes.
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Notes
1 This selection follows, for comparative reasons, the recent ECLAC research project "Growth, Employment and
Equity" (1997-1999), Division of Economic Development, ECLAC, Santiago.
2 Observation by Martine Dirven (personal communication, February 1999).
3 They also correctly point out that most credit went to commercial farmers, and therefore a large section of the
agricultural sector was taxed. Nevertheless, their conclusion undermines the idea that tradables were suppressed, as
these were actually produced by the large commercial farmers.
4 They note that by then the cost of the programme had become unsustainable in budgetary terms.
5 FAO (1996 p.170) notes that between 1990 and 1995 average yields improved by 3.3% per year compared with
1.3% in the 1980s, while—contrary to the 1980s—the cultivated land area decreased by 2.2% per year. The former
data do not correspond with the product-based data in table 2, which were also calculated on the basis of the FAO
data. The difference might come from using a selected group of major crops, but it is left unexplained.
6 An inverse relation can be observed between the rate of increase (or decrease) in sectoral labour productivity and a
decrease (or increase) in employment (Martine Dirven, personal communication, February 1999).
7 According to FAOSTAT data, Latin American agricultural exports as a share of world agricultural exports
remained stable during the period 1960-1985 (annual averages for the five-year subperiods were 11.9%, 11.1%,
11.0%, 11.9% and 11.7%). It dropped to 9.9% in 1985-1990 and 8.0% in 1990-1995 (explained by a significant drop
in agricultural exports from the Caribbean).
8 In the case of coffee, some of the dips in prices coincide with increased volume, and vice versa. This can be
explained by the presence of dominant producer countries such as Brazil and Colombia.
9 The analysis presented here is not fully coherent with the “indexes of structural reform” developed by Morley,
Machado and Pettinato (ECLAC, 1999), measuring commercial, financial, capital account, tax, and privatization
reforms. This paper includes only the impact of the trade and exchange rate regime, fiscal reforms and specific
reforms that affected the agricultural sector.
10 Land has become an even more contested asset then it was during the implementation and regulation of land
reform. In countries where rural insecurity and violence play an important role, such as in Colombia and Peru, land
markets are weakly developed and the “rule of law” is largely absent.
11A (late) recognition of these institutional bottlenecks can be seen in the World Development Report (World Bank,
1997), which stresses the necessity for good governance and capacity building.
12The realization that economic adjustment and modernization have contributed to, rather than mitigated, severe
processes of resource degradation also contributed to this gradual change (Gligo, 1995).
